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Hazardous Waste: Liability of
Predecessors in Title
The United States has a long history of improperly disposed
toxic waste. Over the years, some enterprises that contaminated
their real property through their commercial activities transferred
the property without abating the problem. Consequently, many
subsequent purchasers unknowingly acquired contaminated prop-
erty. The cost associated with the presence of toxic waste can be
devastating to the innocent purchaser. The state and federal envi-
ronmental legislation is inadequate to fully compensate landown-
ers who suffer losses as a result of toxic waste left behind by a
predecessor in title. Therefore, common law remedies must be re-
lied upon to achieve full compensation. This Comment will ex-
plore the viability of the common law doctrine of hazardous
activity strict liability as a cause of action available to a land-
owner against a predecessor in title.
INTRODUCTION
The industrialization of the United States left behind a menacing
by-product-toxic waste." The historical lack of environmental regu-
lation lead to a massive accumulation of toxic waste which is now a
worldwide problem.2 One aspect of this problem involves individuals
I. See R. Lisle Baker & Michael J. Markoff, By-Products Liability: Using Com-
mon Law Private Actions to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 99, 99 (1986).
2. DONALD C. NANNEY, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND ENVIRONMENT RISKS:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE 9 (1990). It is estimated that as early as 1938, the United States
chemical industry was producing more than 170 million pounds of synthetic organic
chemicals. In the 1940s, the United States entered an era which some refer to as the
"chemical revolution." C. HARRIS ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE - CONFRONTING THE
CHALLENGE 5 (1987). It is estimated that the total chemical production in the United
States now is over two trillion pounds each year. Id. A 1980 study by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that American industry produced 41 million metric
tons of hazardous waste each year. Id. (citing Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., and Put-
nam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc., Hazardous Waste Generation and Commercial Hazardous
Waste Management Capacity: An Assessment, 11-2 (Dec. 1980) (prepared for the EPA,
Office of Solid Waste)). A 1984 report to the EPA Office of Solid Waste estimated that
in 1981 alone, 264 million metric tons were produced in the United States. Id. at 9
(citing Westat, Inc., National Survey of Hazardous Waste Generators and Treatment,
Storage, and Disposal Facilities Regulated Under RCRA in 1981, at 2 (Apr. 1984)).
and commercial entities who unknowingly acquired property con-
taminated by toxic waste left behind by a predecessor in title. Not
surprisingly, liability for cleanup costs and other damages is of great
concern to both the landowner and the predecessor in title.
The federal and state governments responded to the perceived cri-
sis by implementing legislation to regulate, compensate, and allocate
liability for toxic waste improperly disposed in the past.3 However,
the federal and state legislation is inadequate to fully compensate
landowners who suffer losses as a result of toxic waste left behind by
a predecessor in title. Neither the federal nor state legislation pro-
vides a cause of action for a variety of economic and consequential
damages which landowners incur when they discover toxic waste on
their premises. Therefore, common law remedies must be relied upon
to achieve full compensation.
Given the inherent dangers associated with toxic waste, the com-
mon law remedy of hazardous activity strict liability is frequently
invoked against those whose toxic waste activities injure others. His-'
torically, hazardous activity strict liability was largely confined to
causes of action against landowners whose toxic waste injured neigh-
boring landowners.' Recently, however, some courts have recognized
hazardous activity strict liability as a viable cause of action available
to a landowner against a predecessor in title who leaves behind toxic
waste.5
This Comment will analyze three major reasons why the hazard-
ous activity strict liability theory should be extended to include pre-
decessors in title who leave behind toxic waste. First, many types of
economic and consequential damages which landowners incur when
toxic waste is discovered on their property may not be recovered
under the federal or state environmental legislation.' The common
3. The primarily federal legislation designed to handle the toxic waste which has
accumulated since the industrial revolution is the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9601-75 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). California's counterpart to CERCLA is the Car-
penter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25300-95 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
4. See examples infra note 90.
5. See examples infra notes 110 and 125.
6. CERCLA only allows compensation for "any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;. . . damages
for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources . . . and the costs of any health
assessment or health effects study carried under 9604(i) of this title." 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9607(a)(4)(B), (C), (D) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). The California environmental
legislation, known as the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act,
only allows commercial enterprises to be compensated for a portion of lost wages or busi-
ness income due to injury of the claimant or property and for the fair market value of the
property if (a) the property is rendered permanently unfit for occupancy and (b) the
owner occupies the property. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25375 (West Supp. 1991).
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law remedy of hazardous activity strict liability helps to bridge this
gap by allowing compensation for tort damages which may not oth-
erwise be recoverable under federal and state environmental legisla-
tion. Second, the underlying policy justification for holding
neighboring landowners strictly liable for their hazardous activities
applies with equal force to predecessors in title.7 Third, because of
the growing concern over the state of the environment and the perni-
cious effects of toxic waste on human health, the ancient doctrine of
caveat emptor should not prevail in the context of real estate trans-
actions involving toxic waste.
I. OVERVIEW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CALIFORNIA
Part I of this Comment briefly sketches'the toxic waste problem in
the United States and California in specific. In order to better un-
derstand the problems many landowners face when toxic waste is
discovered on their premises, it is important to grasp the magnitude
of the toxic waste problem in the United States. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has identified about 27,000 sites requiring
cleanup action under its Superfund program." The General Account-
ing Office (GAO), perhaps less optimistic than the EPA, estimates
that up to 425,000 sites may require cleanup by the EPA.9
This monumental problem is attributable in large part to the his-
torical lack of broad environmental legislation regulating the han-
dling of toxic waste.'0 The storage and disposal of toxic waste in the
past is commonly described as "casual."" In fact, the EPA estimates
that prior to 1980, 90% of the 77.1 billion pounds of hazardous
waste produced each year was disposed of in an improper manner. 12
Because of this lax attitude toward toxic waste disposal, over the
years many purchasers of real property have unknowingly acquired
Therefore, under most circumstances, damages for harm or destruction of real or per-
sonal property, diminution of property value, and inability to finance, develop, or sell the
property are not recoverable under federal or state environmental legislation.
7. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
8. See JOEL MOSKOwITz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1989) (citing 9 Hazardous Waste Rep. No. 11,
at 3 (Feb. 8, 1988)).
9. Id.
10. See NANNEY, supra note 2, at 9.
11. Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamina-
tion in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 32 (1987).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6124.
contaminated property. 3
California has not escaped the toxic waste disposal problem. The
California Department of Health Services (DHS), which maintains
a listing of properties identified as waste sites or potential waste
sites, estimates that in the coming years, 5,000 sites will require
evaluation, and that about 2,000 of those will require cleanup ac-
tion. 4 In California, many innocent purchasers unknowingly ac-
quired contaminated property and may incur huge losses as a
result.' 5 For example, the EPA recently ordered about 31 companies
located in the Burbank, California area to provide over $70 million
for a treatment system to clean up chemical solvent contamination of
a portion of the San Fernando Valley.'8 Significantly, only one of the
companies is actually confirmed as having caused or contributed to
the contamination.'7
II. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION: THE LIMITATIONS
Part II of this comment gives a general overview of the federal
and state environmental legislation designed to handle toxic waste
disposed in the past. This section will clarify the shortcomings of
federal and state environmental legislation in fully compensating
landowners who suffer damages from toxic waste left behind by a
predecessor in title.
13. See, e.g., T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249(1991); Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J.
1990); Prospect Indus. v. Singer Co., 238 N.J. Super. 394, 569 A.2d 908 (1989); Hanlin
Group, Inc. v. International Mineral & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925 (D.C. Me.
1990); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, 90-4431 1991 WL 78820 (E.D.
Pa. June 14, 1991); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93
(D.C. Mass. 1990); Philadelphia Elec. Co v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc. 739 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H.
1990); Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
14. Donald C. Nanney, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Property Transactions,
in HAZARDOUS WASTE AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS 112 (Oct./Nov. 1990) (cit-
ing an oral presentation by William Soo Hoo, Esq. (Assistant Chief Counsel, Toxic Sub-
stances Control Division, DHS), Address Before the Building Industry Association Legal
Clinic on Land Planning & Development Controls (July 15, 1988)).
15. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 19 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20965 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 230 Cal.
App. 3d 1125, 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1991); CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal.
App. 3d 1525, 282 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1991); Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus.,
735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
16. Nanney, supra note 14, at I11.
17. Id.
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A. Federal Environmental Legislation
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)'8 is the major federal environmental legis-
lation in this area. It authorizes the federal government to respond 19
to the release20 or threatened release of hazardous substances2' and
creates a Hazardous Substance Superfund22 to finance the govern-
ment's response activities. 3 CERCLA was enacted to cure deficien-
cies in previously enacted environmental legislation, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),24 specifically the problem
caused by the large number of uncontrolled inactive hazardous waste
sites.25 Because RCRA was only enacted to provide a regulatory
scheme governing the present-day generation of toxic waste,26 CER-
CLA was enacted to address the toxic waste which was generated in
the past, perhaps since the dawn of the industrial revolution. 7
Under CERCLA, when there is a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances, the federal government may either clean
up the site itself" and seek reimbursement for its cleanup costs2"
from statutorily liable parties,30 commonly known as "potentially
responsible parties" (PRPs), or compel the PRPs to clean up the
18. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). In 1986 CERCLA was
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1"986 (SARA),
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
19. For a description of what "respond" under CERCLA entails, see 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601(25) (West Supp. 1991).
20. For a description of what constitutes a "release" under CERCLA, see 42
U.S.C.A. § 9604 (West Supp. 1991).
21. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (West Supp. 1991). Federal legislation describes haz-
ardous substances as "elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions and substances which,
when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health
or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9602 (West Supp. 1991). See also 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602 (West Supp. 1991), 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1990).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(11) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (West Supp. 1991).
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
25. See 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 8, at 5.
26. See 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 8, at 5.
27. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 8, at 6.
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (West Supp. 1991).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
30. Statutorily liable parties are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by con-
tract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged
with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous sub-
stances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
site. 31 Liability under CERCLA is strict 32 and defenses are very lim-
ited.33 CERCLA designates as PRPs current owners of contami-
nated property who are in no way responsible for the
contamination.34 Current owners are designated as PRPs regardless
of fault or participation in the contamination.3 5 Their only associa-
tion with the contamination is current ownership in the land.36 Al-
though in 1986 the so-called "innocent landowner defense" was
added to CERCLA,3 7 the proof requirements are rigorous 38 and con-
sequently have not significantly expanded the third party defense. 39
containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who accepts or ac-
cepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facili-
ties, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1991).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604, 9606(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). The scope of liabil-
ity imposed on current owners who are in no way responsible for the contamination can
run into the millions of dollars. NANNEY, supra note 2, at 5. In the past, the EPA's
approach had been to effect the cleanup themselves and then seek reimbursement from
PRPs. However, in June of 1989, the EPA declared that the priority strategy would now
be to order the cleanup actions by PRPs. Id. at 6.
32. Congress, in a somewhat circuitous manner, stated that "[t]he term 'liable' or
'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which
obtains under § 1321 of Title 33 [Clean Water Act]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32) (West
Supp. 1991). The standard of the Federal Water Pollution Control is strict liability. 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Accordingly, courts interpret CER-
CLA to impose strict liability. See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F.
Supp. 255, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp.
1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Price, 577 F Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.C.N.J.
1983).
33. CERCLA provides for limited defenses against cost recovery action if the PRP
can show "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the contamination was caused
"solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with
the defendant." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
35. NANNEY, supra note 2, at 13. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648
F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,
849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
36. NANNEY, supra note 2, at 13.
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1991). The defense states that the
landowner who acquired the property after the disposal of the toxic waste will not be a
statutorily liable party if he or she can show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
"[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the facility." Id. To establish that the
defendant had no reason to know, the "defendant must have undertaken, at the time of
acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property
consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
38. For requirements, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
39. See NANNEY, supra note 2, at 24; but see United States v. Pacific Depot, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989) (innocent landowner defense recognized).
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Current owners in no way responsible for the contamination, who
are ordered by the EPA to clean up the site, may seek a private right
of action for reimbursement or contribution from other PRPs for any
necessary response costs consistent with the national contingency
plan.4" In the alternative, current owners may undertake a cleanup
on their own initiative (without waiting for a government enforce-
ment action) and seek a private right of action for contribution from
other PRPs for any necessary response costs consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan.41 However, current owners seeking contribu-
tion may only recover for response costs (investigation and
cleanup),42 natural resource damages,43 and health assessment.44
CERCLA provides no compensation for any other types of dam-
ages, such as economic and consequential losses, which landowners
may incur upon the discovery of toxic waste on their property. For
example, toxic waste contamination can severely diminish the prop-
erty value of the site or even render it worthless. The landowner may
not seek compensation for this loss in property value in a CERCLA
40. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C), (D) (West Supp. 1991); § 9607(a)(4)(B)(West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (the party responsible for the contamination shall be liable
for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan"); § 9613(0 (West Supp. 1991); § 9607(f)(1) (West Supp.
1991) ("Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) .... "). For a description of what is consistent with the
national contingency plan, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). For a
discussion of private recovery actions under CERCLA, see generally Jeffrey M. Gaba,
Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action Under CER-
CLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181 (1986). For examples of cases which recognize a private
right of action after the EPA has ordered the party to clean up, see Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1985) (dismissed on different grounds);
Kalik v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 637 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Pinole Point
Properties v. Bethlehem Steel, 596 F. Supp. 283, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1991). Section 9607 has been inter-
preted to create a private right of action, even in the absence of governmental pre-au-
thorization. See Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 19 Envtl. L. Rep.(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20965, 20965 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (private plaintiff may pursue recovery of
cleanup costs without being held legally liable by state or local governments); NL Indus.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to bar a private cause of
action to recover response costs under § 9607 for failure to report the release of the
hazardous substance before incurring response costs); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
648 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (prior government approval not necessary for plaintiff
to state a claim under CERCLA); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas Inc.,
849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1-988); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties,
Inc., 901 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1990).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1991).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1991).
cause of action. 5 In addition, neither personal nor real property
damage or loss, other than damage to natural resources, may be re-
covered under CERCLA.46 Loss of income due to the contamination,
resulting from business interruption or lost rentals, is not compen-
sated under CERCLA. The United States Supreme Court, as well as
lower state and federal courts, consistently reject claims for these
losses.4" One court noted that compensation iar both property and
income loss were intentional omissions of CERCLA.48
In order to understand the shortcomings of CERCLA, it is impor-
tant to note its legislative history. CERCLA's original goals were
much loftier than the legislation actually enacted. Sponsors in both
houses initially proposed the CERCLA legislation as a broad federal
regulatory scheme which would provide a basis for environmental
claims by the government and private parties.49 The leading Senate
Superfund bill,50 which was not adopted, provided a private cause of
action for, among other things, all damages for economic loss and
loss due to personal injury.51 However, these features were ulti-
mately rejected. According to the Chairman of the Senate Environ-
ment and Public Works Committee, the substitute bill (the current
45. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 8, at 152 ("No recovery may be had under CER-
CLA for diminution of the value of the property, nor for consequential damages.");
SUPERFUND § 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH CONG.. 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES 125
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP] ("CERCLA ... does not provide for
damage for loss or injury to private property . . ").
46. See NANNEY, supra note 2, at 169 ("Property damage claims (other than dam-
ages to natural resources) are not redressed by CERCLA.").
47. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986) ("Superfund money
[is not] available to compensate private parties for economic harms that result from the
discharges of hazardous substances."); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 621 F. Supp. 370
(W.D. Tenn. 1985) (private right of action for damages only are not available under
CERCLA, as recoverable costs are limited to costs incurred for cleanup of the site);
Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988)
(CERCLA only authorizes recovery of cleanup costs, not damages suffered as a conse-
quence of the contamination); Wehner v. Syntex, 681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. 1987)
("Economic damages for loss of property are not covered by the [CERCLA] statute.");
Piccolini v. Simpon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff
could not seek monetary damages as compensation for alleged loss of value of land under
a CERCLA cause of action).
48. Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("One of the deliberate omissions of CERCLA was reimbursement for prop-
erty or income loss.").
49. See Michael Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Dis-
posal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 267 (1981). See
generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL,
L. 1 (1982); Joseph K. Brenner, Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste:
The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1981).
50. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(2)(A)-(G) (1980).
51. See id. Losses which would have been recoverable under this bill included any
injury, destruction or loss of any real or personal property, or any loss of use thereof, and
any loss of income or profits or impairment of earning capacity due to personal injury or
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CERCLA legislation) contained many concessions from the original
bill, such as the deletion of the federal cause of action for property
or income loss.52 In choosing to enact CERCLA, Congress made it
clear that no compensation for property, income, or other economic
losses resulting from toxic contamination would be afforded. 53 The
legislative history of CERCLA confirms that Congress intended to
provide a vehicle for cleaning up hazardous waste sites, rather than a
new front of law which would allow private parties to be compen-
sated for economic and consequential damages.
B. State Environmental Legislation
Most states have environmental protection legislation largely anal-
ogous to CERCLA.54 California's counterpart to CERCLA is the
Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act.55
Like CERCLA, liability under California's environmental law is
strict,56 and current owners are designated as PRPs.57 The California
statute also authorizes a private right of action for cleanup cost re-
covery by a landowner who voluntarily or under order cleans up the
contamination against other PRPs, except where the liability of a
PRP has been formally apportioned. 8
The California legislation does provide some compensation for
commercial enterprises from its superfund for certain types of losses
beyond that of CERCLA. For example, a limited amount may be
recovered for lost wages or business income due to injury of the
claimant or property. In addition, property owners may recover the
fair market value of their property if: (a) the property is rendered
permanently unfit for occupancy, and (b) the owner occupies the
property.59 Unfortunately, other consequential losses, such as real
from injury to or destruction of real or personal property.
52. 126 CONG. REC. S14964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Randolph).
53. See generally Grad, supra note 49, at 21-22.
54. NANNEY, supra note 2, at 32.
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-95 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25363 (West Supp. 1991) ("The standard of
liability for any costs or expenses recoverable is strict liability .... ).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25323.5(a) (West Supp. 1991) (PRPs are
defined as "those persons described in section 107(a) of the federal act (42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)))." California has a provision which states that innocent owners of property
may not be ordered to perform solely on the basis of that ownership. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25358.3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
58. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25363(e) (West Supp. 1991).
59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25375 (West Supp. 1991).
and personal property damage and diminution of property value (if
the premises are not rendered permanently unfit for occupancy),
may not be recovered in most circumstances. However, California
law states that nothing in its provisions affects or modifies common
law liability.60
In short, neither state nor federal legislation provides a landowner
who is injured by toxic waste with a remedy which fully compensates
the landowner for its actual damages. Apparently, the priority of the
federal and state environmental legislation is to ensure that the site
is cleaned up, not to provide recovery mechanisms for actual dam-
ages for harm suffered."' For these damages, common law theories
must be utilized.
III. HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY STRICT LIABILITY OVERVIEW
A. Historical Roots of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability
Part III of this Comment presents an overview of the theory of
hazardous activity strict liability and its application in the United
States. Prior to the seminal decision of Rylands v. Fletcher,2 a land-
owner who complained of an unauthorized interference with his or
her right to possession and quiet enjoyment of land was limited to
trespass 3 or nuisance 4 causes of action, as they were historically
defined. No cause of action pertained to non-continual activity on
the defendant's property that indirectly interfered with the plaintiff's
property rights.65 This was the setting for the Rylands decision.
B. The Rule of Rylands
Strict liability for harm arising from unusually dangerous condi-
tions and activities has its genesis in Rylands v. Fletcher.6 In Ry-
lands, the plaintiff's coal mine was damaged by the escape of water
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25366(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991)
("Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities
of any person under any other provision of state and federal law, including common law
61. Hingerty, supra note 11, at 35.
62. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
63. Historically, the requirements for trespass to land were "an invasion (a) which
interfered with the right of exclusive possession of the land and (b) which was the direct
result of some act committed by the defendant." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON].
64. Historically, nuisance consisted of an interference with the use and enjoyment
of one's land that was offensive to the senses and continuing or recurring. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 63, § 86, at 617, and § 78, at 545.
65. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 545.
66. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
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from a mill-owner's reservoir.6 7 The defendant had not been negli-
gent and neither nuisance nor trespass were viable causes of action
because of the non-continual, indirect nature of the flooding. The
Exchequer Chamber wrote that "the true rule of law is, that the
person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it
in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 68
The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Exchequer's decision, but
added that the defendant's use of his land had to be a "non-natural
use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its
natural condition was not in or upon it."'69
At the time of Rylands, the industrialization of the United States
was in its infancy.70 Consequently, American acceptance of hazard-
ous activity strict liability was slow. Strict liability was seen as an
interference with the industrialization process.7" As industry ma-
tured, the force of the foregoing objection weakened, and the concept
that hazardous enterprises should be liable for injuries which they
inflicted gained some recognition. 2 In 1924, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized a cause of action for strict liability based on the
rule in Rylands for the escape of water.73 Four years later, in Green
v. General Petroleum Corp.,74 the California Supreme Court held a
non-negligent oil company strictly liable when its oil well exploded,
casting debris on plaintiff's property.75 The Green court articulated a
67. Id. at 332.
68. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-Ex. Ch. 265, 279 (1866).
69. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 339 (1868).
70. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Hazardous Activity Strict Liability,
65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 262 (1987).
71. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 549 ("[O]ne important rea-
son often given for the rejection of strict liability was that it was not adapted to an
expanding civilization. Dangerous enterprises involving a high degree of risk to others,
were clearly indispensable to the industrial and commercial development of a new coun-
try and it was considered in the interest of those in the vicinity of such enterprises to give
way to them, and that too great a burden must not be placed on them."); William R.
Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 913 (1981); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 485-86 (1973). See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873); Brown v. Col-
lins, 53 N.J. 442 (1873).
72. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 549. See, e.g., Bridgeman-
Russell v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971 (1924); Green v. General Pe-
troleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928); Exner v. Sherman Power Construction
Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
73. Bridgeman-Russell v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971 (1924).
74. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
75. Id.
broad principle of strict liability by stating:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and
proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions, and, with
knowledge that injury may result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to
the other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however care-
fully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury should in all
fairness, be required to compensate the other for the injury done."'
C. Restatement of Torts Sections 519 and 520
In 1938, the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) articulated its the-
ory of hazardous activity strict liability in sections 519 and 520 of
the Restatement of Torts. Section 519 provides:
"One who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose
person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by
the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto
from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm."'7
Section 520 defines an ultrahazardous activity as one that "(a) nec-
essarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage."' 78 The central theme
is that actors, usually enterprises, who engage in an activity which
creates an abnormal risk of serious harm should be held strictly lia-
ble, despite the social utility of the activity.79 The policy rationale is
that those enterprises causing harm should absorb the cost of harm
inflicted by their dangerous activities.80 Following the adoption of
the first Restatement, more courts began to apply strict liability
principles to a variety of activities. 81
D. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 519 and 520
In 1977, the A.L.I. adopted sections 519 and 520 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Section 519 states that "[o]ne who carries
on abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
76. Id. at 955.
77. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
78. Id. § 520.
79. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 555.
80. Id.
81. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at 270-71. For examples of ultrahazardous
activities, see Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation); Loe
v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (crop dusting); Smith v. Lockheed Pro-
pulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 744, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (rocket testing on ranch
land); Sacks v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968) (pile driving in a peat
bog); Gorton v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 339 F. Supp. 241 (D. Mass. 1972) (dynamite blasting);
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983(1973) (hauling of gasoline).
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although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm."82
Section 520 .sets out six factors that a court should consider in deter-
mining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous." The factors
are as follows:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; '
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes.
83
The Restatement (Second) adds two additional factors to be consid-
ered when deciding if an activity is abnormally dangerous: factors
(e) and (f).84 Using this definition, courts have found activities such
as pile driving, 5 storage of explosives,86 and operation of a propane
gas storage yard87 to be hazardous activities to which strict liability
attaches.
IV. APPLICATION OF HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY STRICT LIABILITY
AGAINST LANDOWNERS WHOSE TOXIC WASTE FLOWS
ONTO THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS
Part IV of this Comment analyzes how the theory of hazardous
activity strict liability is utilized against landowners whose toxic
waste flows onto the property of others. The theory of hazardous ac-
tivity strict liability now receives general judicial recognition.88 In
the past, some skepticism existed about the application of hazardous
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
83. Id. § 520.
84. Scholars have noted that the addition of these last two factors makes the test
for hazardous activity strict liability look more like a test for negligence. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 555.
85. Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Washington Park Towers, 89 Wash. 2d 72, 569 P.2d
1141 (1977).
86. Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Ala. 1978).
87. Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 264 Ark. 27, 571 S.W.2d 74 (1978).
88. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 549. Most states accept some
form of the Rylands rule. By 1984, only seven states (Maine, New Hampshire, New
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, and probably Wyoming) claim to have rejected
the Rylands decision by name. Id. See also Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Trans-
porters and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949, 969-70 (1980); Jon
G. Anderson, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous,
Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 100 (1978) ("[T]he
Rylands principle of strict liability is given nearly universal recognition in the United
States ....").
activity strict liability to the generation, storage, and disposal of
toxic waste.8 9 Nonetheless, courts increasingly recognize the cause of
action against neighboring landowners whose hazardous substance-
producing activities injure others.9" Given the inherent danger posed
to surrounding landowners by the generation, storage, and disposal
of toxic waste, these activities seem to be natural candidates for haz-
ardous activity strict liability. 1
In 1983, the New Jersey Supreme Court held a landowner strictly
liable for harm resulting from toxic waste produced on the land
which seeped onto surrounding property. In State Department of
Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 2 the defendants oper-
ated a mercury processing plant and dumped untreated waste onto
the land for almost fifty years.93 There was an estimated 268 tons of
toxic waste on the tract which seeped into a creek, contaminating the
water and surrounding premises."4 The plaintiff brought suit for the
cost of cleanup and abatement costs of the mercury pollution." In
finding the defendant strictly liable for resultant damages, the Ven-
tron court stated that it was
time to recognize expressly that the law of liability has evolved so that a
landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic wastes that
are stored on his property and flow onto the property of others .... The net
result is that those who use, or permit others to use, land for the conduct of
abnormally dangerous activities are strictly liable for resultant damages.00
The court adopted sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts for abnormally dangerous activity.9 7 In analyzing the six
factors in section 520 for determining whether an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous, the court found that: (a) the toxic wastes that seep
89. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at 293; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 71,
at 913-20 (Restatement and Restatement (Second) suggest "that where the nature and
magnitude of the risk could not be anticipated at the time of disposal ... and the harm-
ful potential of the substances was scientifically unascertainable," strict liability will not
be invoked); Note, supra note 88, at 969-76.
90. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983);
Crawford v. National Lead Co., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21174 (D.C. Ohio
1989); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); City of North-
glenn, Colo. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp 515 (D. Colo. 1981). However, not all
courts have accepted the concept of strict liability based on hazardous activity, much less
for the storage or disposal of hazardous waste. In one New Hampshire case, the defend-
ant, a neighboring landowner, released chemicals which harmed the plaintiff's property.
The court refused to recognize a cause of action for hazardous activity strict liability and
required that the plaintiff instead prove negligence. Bagley v. Controlled Envtl. Corp.,
127 N.H. 556, 503 A.2d 823 (1986).
91. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 70, at 313.
92. 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
93. Id. at 483-84, 468 A.2d at 154.
94. Id. at 481, 468 A.2d at 154.
95. Id. at 482, 468 A.2d at 154.
96. Id. at 488, 468 A.2d at 157.
97. Id. at 492-93, 468 A.2d at 159-60.
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onto neighboring land necessarily harm the environment; (b) toxic
waste disposal may cause a variety of harms; (c) there is no safe way
to dispose of mercury by dumping it onto land or into water; (e)
mercury disposal was inappropriate to the area; and (f) the activity
was not of value to the community because dumping of hazardous
waste is a major problem in New Jersey. 98 Significantly, the court
did not address factor (d), whether the activity was a matter of
"common usage." The Ventron court concluded, given that set of
facts, the disposal of mercury and other toxic waste, past or present,
was an abnormally dangerous activity.99 The court articulated its
policy rationale by stating that while the disposal of toxic waste is of
some use to society, the inevitable risk inherent in the activity man-
dates that it be carried out at its own peril, rather than at the peril
of innocent persons who are harmed as a consequence. 100 The court
broadly concluded that "[t] hose who poison the land must pay for its
cure."
10 1
A Florida district court recognized a landowner's cause of action
for hazardous activity strict liability against a neighboring mining
company whose reservoir broke and allowed about one billion gallons
of phosphate slimes to escape.102 The court stated that while histori-
cally it was vital that landowners be permitted to use their land in
any manner to promote commercial and industrial development, the
situation had changed. 0 3 The court concluded that although there
are many hazardous activities which are still socially desirable, ac-
tors who engage in these activities should be held responsible for the
resulting harm. 04 An innocent neighbor should not have to bear the
burden.0 5
Similarly, an Ohio district court held operators of a uranium
metal production plant strictly liable to neighboring landowners for
their hazardous waste disposal activities. 06 The defendant operated
98. Id.
99. Id. at 493, 468 A.2d at 160.
100. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977)).
101. Id.
102. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The
court mentions §§ 519 and 520 of the Restatement of Torts and §§ 519 and 520 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, but appears to give decisive weight to the non-natural
use rationale of Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868), in deciding to
apply strict liability.
103. Cities Serv. Co., 312 So. 2d at 801.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Crawford v. National Lead Co., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21174
(D.C. Ohio 1989).
the plant from 1951 through 1985, during which it discharged ura-
nium into the river, soil, and atmosphere.107 Applying sections 519
and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court found that
the production of uranium constituted an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity and the company was therefore strictly liable for the resulting
harm."o8
V. STRICT LIABILITY FOR POLLUTING PREDECESSORS
Part V examines the viability of a hazardous activity strict liabil-
ity cause of action by a landowner against predecessors in title who
leave behind toxic waste. This section proposes that the underlying
policies of hazardous activity strict liability justify its application in
this context. Property and contract defenses, such as caveat emptor
and "as is" disclaimers, are shown to be potentially inappropriate in
the realm of toxic waste contamination.
A. Courts Which Recognize the Theory of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability as a Viable Cause of Action Against a
Predecessor in Title
The Supreme Court of New Jersey is the only state supreme court
thus far to specifically recognize the theory of hazardous activity
strict liability as a viable cause of action for landowners against pol-
luting predecessors in title. However, the N ew Jersey courts are rec-
ognized leaders in the realm of environmental law 0 9 and therefore
may influence other courts' rulings on toxic waste issues. In T & E
Industry v. Safety Light Corp., a landowner brought suit against a
predecessor in title who left behind radium contaminants on the
property.110 From 1917 to 1926, the defendant's corporate predeces-
sor, United States Radium Corp. (USRC), operated a radium-
processing plant on the property, where it buried the radioactive
waste."' Forty-eight years later, T & E purchased the property una-
ware of the presence of radioactive waste." 2 In 1979, the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection instructed T&E to
clean up the radium contamination." 3 T & E filed suit against all
successor corporations of USRC in 1981."1
107. Id. at 21174-75.
108. Id. at 21175.
109. New Jersey has acquired pre-eminence in the field of environmental law be-
cause of its large hazardous waste problem. 4 Toxic L. Rep. No. 9, at 247 (Aug. 2,
1989).
110. 123 N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991).
111. Id. at 376, 587 A.2d at 1252.
112. Id. at 379, 587 A.2d at 1253.
113. Id. at 379-80, 587 A.2d at 1253.
114. Id. at 380-81, 587 A.2d at 1254.
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The precise issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was
whether an owner of radium-contaminated property could hold a
predecessor in title who was responsible for the contamination
strictly liable for damages caused by that predecessor's abnormally
dangerous activity. 115 The court rejected the contention that the
cause of action only applied to instances of interference with a
neighbor's property, and not to instances of harm to successive land-
owners."16 The court found that processing, handling, and disposal of
radium under the facts of the case constituted an abnormally dan-
gerous activity as defined by sections 519 and 520 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.117 Defendant Safety Light was held strictly
liable for the losses and injuries proximately caused by the hazard-
ous activities of its predecessors.118
The court focused on two policies underlying hazardous activity
strict liability which merited application of the theory to predeces-
sors in title. First, enterprises should be held responsible for the
harm caused by their hazardous activities."' Second, enterprises can
more easily spread the cost of accidents attributable to hazardous
activities by passing it onto the consumer. 2 The court noted that
neither policy was premised on property rights.' 2' Rather, the first
policy was designed to induce certain enterprises to be responsible
for the external costs of activities, 22 while the second aimed to shift
the seemingly inevitable loss onto the party best able to administer
the cost.' 23 Consequently, the court held that liability for harm
caused by abnormally dangerous activities does not necessarily cease
with the transfer of property. 24
Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision of T & E Indus-
try, some lower courts in New Jersey and elsewhere recognized that
115. Id. at 375, 587 A.2d at 1251.
116. Id. at 384-87, 587 A.2d at 1256-57.
117. Id. at 390-95, 587 A.2d at 1259-61. The court specifically noted that "a court
must make the determination about the abnormally dangerous character of an activity
one case at a time." Id. at 391, 587 A.2d at 1259.
118. Id. at 390-95, 587 A.2d at 1263. Damages awarded to the plaintiff included
indemnification for cleanup costs, the value of the building and improvements of the land
if they had'to be demolished ih the cleanup process, the cost of improving the plaintiff's
relocation site, the carrying costs of the new facility while the contaminated site was
being cleaned up, and the maintenance expense of the contaminated site. Id.






a predecessor in title may be strictly liable to a successor owner for
damages caused by its toxic waste disposal activities. 125 In Amland
v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA), the plaintiff purchased an
industrial manufacturing plant contaminated with polychlorinated
byphelyn (PCB), allegedly by the defendant, a predecessor in title. 128
From 1956 to 1965, defendant ALCOA created PCB byproducts
which contaminated the land. 27 ALCOA sold the premises in 1968
and, after two intervening owners, Amland purchased the property
in 1983.128 Amland discovered the PCB contamination in 1985 and
brought suit in 1986 against ALCOA, asserting, among other com-
mon law theories, a hazardous activity strict liability cause of action
and a CERCLA cause of action. 12 9 The federal district court, apply-
ing New Jersey law, rejected the distinction that strict liability only
applies to interference with a neighbor's property.130 In upholding
the cause of action, the court found that the theory of hazardous
activity strict liability applies to instances of harm to successive
landowners.' 3'
Similarly, in Allied Corp. v. Frola,132 a landowner was permitted
to assert a hazardous activity strict liability cause of action against
the vendor of contaminated property. 133 In rejecting claims for tres-
pass or nuisance, the court noted that New Jersey had moved to-
wards strict liability as the preferred theory in environmental
pollution cases between successive landowners. 34
In a 1990 district court case in Maine, a purchaser of a heavily
contaminated manufacturing plant sued a predecessor in title who
left behind toxic materials. 35 The defendant operated a chemical
manufacturing facility on the property from 1967 until 1982, during
which it discharged mercury and other hazardous contaminants. 30
In 1982, it sold the property to the plaintiff who was unaware of the
125. See, e.g., Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp.
784 (D.N.J. 1989); Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 238 N.J. Super. 394, 569 A.2d
908 (1989); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990); Hanlin Group, Inc.
v. International Mineral & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925 (D. Me. 1990) (court re-
jected the defendant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the hazardous activity
strict liability count).
126. 711 F. Supp. 784, 787 (D.N.J. 1989).
127. Id. at 787.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 788-89.
130. Id. at 802-03.
131. Id.
132. 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990).
133. Id. at 630.
134. Id. at 634.
135. Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp.
925 (D. Me. 1990).
136. Id. at 927-28.
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contamination." 7 In 1986, the plaintiff was ordered by the EPA to
fund the cleanup.13 The plaintiff sued the defendant seeking relief
under CERCLA and various common law remedies, including haz-
ardous activity strict liability. 3 The court denied the defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleading, rejecting the defendant's con-
tention that the strict liability claim failed because it did not allege
injury to property other than which the plaintiff purchased. 40
B. Courts Which Have Rejected the Theory of Hazardous
Activity Strict Liability as a Viable Cause of Action
Against Polluting Predecessors in Title
Some courts refuse to extend the hazardous activity strict liability
cause of action from a claim available to neighbors to a claim availa-
ble to subsequent owners of the property. In Wellesley Hills Realty
Trust v. Mobil Oil Corpz, 4' purchasers of contaminated property
sued the prior owner-vendor of the premises for harm that the pur-
chasers incurred as a result of hazardous waste left behind. 42 The
purchaser asserted that the vendor contaminated the property by re-
leasing hazardous materials during its operation of a service station
on the premises from 1926 to 1987.113 In rejecting the plaintiffs'
claim for hazardous activity strict liability, the court found the oper-
ation of a gas station qualifies as an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity.144 The court noted the risk of the release of oils is precisely what
makes the operation of a gas station abnormally dangerous, and such
contamination of property constitutes harm to the property. 145 De-
spite this, the court held the plaintiff failed to state a claim for strict
liability because the vendor's operation of the station "caused harm
to property of its own not property of another.' 146 The court con-
cluded the articulation of hazardous activity strict liability in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts requires the harm resulting from the
hazardous activity to be to the person or property of another. 147 The
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 927.
140. Id. at 934.
141. 747 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1990).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 94.
144. Id. at 101.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 101-02.
147. Id.
court noted, while the rule of Rylands eventually expanded to en-
compass situations that did not involve an "escape" from the land,
harm to the property or person of another has always been a
requirement.14 8
A Florida court of appeal followed the Wellesley court's view of
hazardous activity strict liability. In Futura Realty v. Lone Star
Building Centers (Eastern), Inc., 49 the current owner of a parcel of
land brought a hazardous activity strict liability cause of action
against the prior owner and lessee of the prior owner for damage to
the site through the use of certain toxic chemicals.1 50 In support of
its claim, Futura cited T & E Industry v. Safety Light Corp.."'
However, the Florida court disagreed with the New Jersey court's
analysis and instead followed the Wellesley decision. 152 The Futura
court refused to extend the cause of action from a claim available to
neighbors to a claim available to subsequent owners of property. 53
The court's principal rationale was that the purchaser of commercial
property is able to protect itself through careful inspection and price
negotiations.55 Therefore, the vendor is not liable to the purchaser
for damage to the land. The court found this factor to be the main
distinction between the duty owed a neighbor and the duty owed a
purchaser of real property. 55
C. Underlying Policies of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability
Merit Its Application Against Polluting Predecessors in Title
The theory of hazardous activity strict liability as articulated in
Rylands v. Fletcher"' seemed to anticipate the harm would be
caused by an "escape" of the danger from the actor's land to the
land of another.157 The rule eventually expanded to encompass situa-
tions which did not necessarily involve an "escape" from the actor's
148. Id. at 102.
149. 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1.50. Id. at 364.
151. Id. at 365. T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J. Super. 228, 546
A.2d 570 (1988), was the New Jersey court of appeal decision which held that previous
owners of property who operated a radium processor were strictly liable to subsequent
purchasers. The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently affirmed this holding at 123
N.J. 371, 587 A.2d 1249 (1991).
152. Futura Realty, 578 So. 2d at 365 (following Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v.




156. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
157. See Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 102
(D. Mass. 1990) ("The original articulation of the rule in Rylands anticipated that such
harm would be caused by the 'escape' of the danger from the actor's land."); Anderson,
supra note 88, at 105 ("The doctrine [of Rylands] does not apply only in the adjacent
landowning situation, although that is its genesis and major use.").
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land onto a neighbor's land. 1 5 For example, an actor who engages in
an abnormally dangerous activity will be strictly liable for harm to
persons (not trespassers) who come on the land. 59
Although hazardous activity strict liability originally grew out of a
need to supplement the law governing the rights of adjacent land-
owners, the policy rationales underlying the theory justify a more
expansive application.6 0 Hazardous activity strict liability reflects a
broad policy determination that enterprises which introduce a high
risk of harm into the community, for their own profit, should bear
the costs of harm caused by their activities.16 ' Accordingly, prede-
cessors in title who engaged in hazardous activities, such as the crea-
tion and disposal of toxic waste, which harm a subsequent purchaser
should not escape strict liability simply because the harmed entity is
not a neighboring landowner. Holding a predecessor in title strictly
liable reflects a modern policy determination that enterprises who
contaminate the property should retain responsibility for the harm
caused by the toxic waste throughout the life of the toxic waste, ab-
sent overt acceptance of liability by the purchaser.' 62
Moreover, holding a predecessor in title strictly liable for toxic
waste contamination is not a new concept in the realm of environ-
mental law. The standard of liability for responsible parties under
CERCLA and California legislation is strict liability. 6 3 However,
under CERCLA, even parties who took title after the hazardous
substances were deposited, but who in no way contributed to the con-
tamination, may be held strictly liable if such owners were actually
aware of the presence of hazardous waste when they transferred the
property." A hazardous activity strict liability cause of action
158. See Anderson, supra note 88, at 105-06.
159. Id.; see, e.g., McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d
635 (1970).
160. T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 386, 587 A.2d 1249, 1257
(1991) ("Although the rule grew out of a need to fill a void in the law governing the
rights of adjacent landowners, another thread woven into its rationale justifies a much
broader application.").
161. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 556 ("[C]ertain conditions and
activities may be so hazardous to another or to the public generally and of such relative
infrequent occurrence to justify allocating the risk of loss to the enterpriser engaging in
such conduct as a cost of doing business."); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396,
410, 181 A.2d 487, 494 (1962) (an enterprise that introduces unusual danger into the
community should pay its own way if harm is caused to others).
162. Laura M. Schleich, An "As Is" Provision in a Commercial Property Con-
tract: Should It Be Left As Is When Assessing Liability for Environmental Torts?, 51 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 995, 1009 (1990).
163. See supra notes 32, 56.
164. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1991) ("[I]f the defendant obtained
would only target those past owners and users who participated in
the hazardous activity and not those who did not engage in hazard-
ous activities, but were merely interim owners.
Whether an enterprise's knowledge, or ability to obtain such
knowledge, of the hazardous nature of its activity should be assessed
at the time the enterprise engaged in the activity, or at a later time,
is an open question. Some commentators take the position that the
Restatement standards for hazardous activity strict liability suggest
risk must be foreseeable. 165 However, the applicable case law is un-
clear.166 The court in T & E Industry found the defendant had am-
ple constructive knowledge of the dangers associated with its
activities and therefore did not resolve the issue whether strict liabil-
ity is contingent upon such knowledge.16 7 However, the court stated
in dicta that the requirements of "'knowledge' and 'foreseeability'
smack of negligence and may be inappropriate in the realm of strict
liability."' 68
D. Hazardous Activity Strict Liability in California
The California Supreme Court has twice ruled on the applicability
of hazardous activity strict liability. In 1928, the California Supreme
actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such
facility when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred
ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such
defendant shall be treated as liable . . . and no defense . . . shall be available to such
defendant.").
165. The first Restatement's articulation of hazardous activity strict liability in-
cluded foreseeability of the type of harm and the class of persons injured as a require-
ment for applying strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 519 (1938) (actor is liable only to those who he "should recognize as likely to be
harmed," and then only for harm "which makes the activity ultrahazardous"). The Re-
statement (Second) retained the language limiting liability to the type of harm which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous, but deleted the language limiting liability to
the class of persons foreseeably harmed by the actor's activities. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). For commentators who propose that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) standards for hazardous activity suggest the risk must be foreseeable, see James R.
Zazzali & Frank P. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON
HALL L. REV. 446, 462 (1983) ("The Restatement (Second) formula of strict liability,
adopting an "abnormally dangerous" activity test, requires a balancing of numerous fac-
tors such as the utility of the activity, the foreseeability of harm, and the appropriateness
of the locale of the activity."); Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 71, at 918 (foresceability
requirement present in both Restatements); M.L Lieberman, Absolute Liability for UI-
trahazardous Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CAL. L. REV.
269, 272 (1949) (Restatement impliedly requires foreseeability of risk).
166. See, e.g., Garcia v. Estate of Norton, 183 Cal. App. 3d 413, 420, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 108, 112 (1986) (actual knowledge of the extent of danger involved in an ul-
trahazardous activity is not required); Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 807 (D.N.J. 1989) (it is not certain whether the defendant's
knowledge of the risk involved in a hazardous activity is a necessary finding under RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)).
167. 123 N.J. 371, 393, 587 A.2d 1249, 1260 (1991).
168. Id.
[VOL. 29; 93. 1992] Hazardous Waste
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Court in Green v. General Petroleum Corp.- 9 held a non-negligent
oil company strictly liable for damage to a neighbor's property when
one of its oil wells exploded. The court held that when a person com-
mits an act with knowledge an injury may result, and injury does
result, even if all due care was exercised, in "fairness" the actor
should compensate the injured party. 10 In 1948, the California Su-
preme Court again decided the issue of hazardous activity strict lia-
bility. In Luthringer v. Moore,'7 ' a fumigator was held strictly liable
when gas from a fumigated basement seeped into an adjacent phar-
macy and injured the plaintiff.17 2 Although the court mentioned the
Rylands decision'"3 and quoted extensively from sections 519 and
520 of the Restatement,17 4 it did not specifically adopt either. In-
stead, the court followed the principle of hazardous activity strict
liability articulated in Green 75 and added that "certain activities
under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public gener-
ally, and of such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call
for strict liability as the best public policy."17 6
Curiously, the California Supreme Court has not considered the
issue since the Luthringer17 7 decision in 1948. California lower court
decisions utilize both Restatement'" and Restatement (Second)'
theories of hazardous activity strict liability. Two California lower
court decisions, however, appear to go beyond both of the Restate-
ments. These cases focus instead on fairness and public policy, which
are actually what both the Green'80 and Luthringer'I ' courts empha-
169. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
170. Id. at 334, 270 P. 955.
171. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
172. Id. at 492-94, 190 P.2d at 3.
173. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
174. Id. at 499, 190 P.2d at 7.
175. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8. The court stated, "[T]here can be no doubt that the
case of Green v. General Petroleum Corporation ... enunciated a principle of absolute
liability which is applicable to the instant case." Id.
176. Id. at 500, 190 P.2d at 8.
177. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
178. See, e.g., Garcia v. Estate of Norton, 183 Cal. App. 3d 413, 228 Cal. Rptr.
108 (1986).
179. See, e.g., SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1984); Goodwin v. Reilly, 176 Cal. App. 3d 86, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1985).
180. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
181. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
sized. 182 In Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 83 the court applied
hazardous activity strict liability to the test firing of a rocket motor
that resulted in damage to nearby property.18 4 The court stated that
"[p]ublic policy" called for strict liability because a profit-oriented
enterprise was in the best position to spread the loss to the public. 16
In Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,' 88 the court held
a railroad company strictly liable for harm resulting from an explo-
sion occurring in the course of transporting bombs pursuant to a gov-
ernment contract, despite the traditional immunity for common
carriers transporting hazardous items.8 7 In reaching this conclusion,
the Chavez court emphasized the public policy of loss spreading.',
In the California courts, plaintiffs injured by toxic waste increas-
ingly seek to hold those who created the contamination strictly lia-
ble. For example, in Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow
Chemical Co., a9 a landowner sued a predecessor in title who had
left behind toxic waste on the property for damages suffered by the
landowner when the toxic waste was discovered. In short, the court
refused to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the hazardous ac-
tivity strict liability count. 190 Significantly, the court did dismiss the
private nuisance cause of action, holding that nuisance law does not
authorize a landowner to sue a previous owner. 91 The court appar-
ently did not find this to be an obstacle for hazardous activity strict
liability.
In another district court case, Pinole Point Properties v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp.,92 a landowner discovered toxic waste on the prop-
erty which had been left behind by the defendant, a predecessor in
title.' 3 The landowner sued the defendant on various common law
theories, including hazardous activity strict liability, and also as-
serted a CERCLA cause of action. 94 Although the court dismissed
182. In Green, the court stated that the defendant "should, in all fairness, be re-
quired to compensate." Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 955
(1928) (emphasis added). In Luthringer, the court found "strict liability as the best pub-
lic policy." Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (1948) (emphasis
added).
183. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
186. 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
187. Id. at 1213-14. For a description of the common carrier immunity, see RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 521 (1938) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 521
(1977).
188. Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-09 (E.D. Cal.
1976).
189. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20965 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
190. Id. at 20966.
191. Id.
192. 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
193. Id. at 285.
194. Id.
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the hazardous activity strict liability claim as barred by the statute
of limitations, it stated in dicta that even if the claim was not time
barred, it would fail on the merits. 195 The court stated that "strict
liability in tort is 'limited to the kind of harm the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.' "19 The court opined that
the harm alleged by the plaintiff, that is the cost of cleanup and the
diminished property value, was not the type of harm for which strict
liability would attach.197
As the above cases indicate, it is far from certain how California
courts will decide on the issue of hazardous activity strict liability for
the generation, storage, or disposal of toxic waste. At this time, no
California court has squarely decided whether the generation, stor-
age, or disposal of toxic waste is a hazardous activity to which strict
liability attaches. Therefore, whether a predecessor in title, or even a
neighboring landowner, can be held strictly liable for his or her toxic
waste activities is still an open question. However, in light of the
favorable precedent of Green'98 and Luthringer,99 and lower court
decisions such as Lockheed °0 and Chavez,2 0 ' California courts have
a solid base for applying hazardous activity strict liability to the gen-
eration, storage, and disposal of toxic waste for both neighboring
landowners and purchasers of contaminated land.
E. Caveat Emptor and "As Is" Clauses
The ancient doctrine of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware")
assumes that, absent an express agreement, fraud, or concealment,
the vendor of land is not liable to the purchaser for the condition of
the land existing at the time of transfer.02 Sellers have long been
protected by this doctrine.203 However, the doctrine of caveat emptor
195. Id. at 292 n.5.
196. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977)).
197. Id.
198. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
199. 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
200. 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967).
201. 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 (1965) ("Except as stated in
section 353, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
vendee or others while on the land after the vendee has taken possession by any danger-
ous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time the vendee took
possession."); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (the doctrine of caveat
emptor does not exempt a seller from responsibility if the seller is guilty of fraud or
concealment).
203. See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808
(1942); Henshaw v. Cabeceiras, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 437 N.E.2d 1072 (1982).
has not maintained its original vigor.2 °4 The continuing validity of
the doctrine has been questioned in many contexts. For example, in
the area of products liability the doctrine has been largely aban-
doned because of safety, 20 5 fairness, 200 and loss spreading ratio-
nales.20 7 Similarly, builder-vendors of homes may also be denied the
defense of caveat emptor, in favor of the doctrine of implied war-
ranty of habitability, when purchasers find defects in design and
construction. o8
Courts which have considered the doctrine of caveat emptor in the
context of toxic waste have reached different results. 20 In T & E
Industry, the court rejected the argument that caveat emptor re-
lieved the polluting predecessor in title from liability.210 The court
noted that it had refused to recognize the validity of caveat emptor
in a variety of situations, such as when purchasers of new homes
discover defects 'in the property attributable to the builder-ven-
dors.211 The court explained that the builder-vendor exception was
premised on the belief that the builder-vendor is in a better position
204. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 450, 317 A.2d 68, 71 (1974);
Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash. App. 220, 224, 491 P.2d 1312, 1315 (1971).
205. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d
168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rtpr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, E.R. Squibb & Sons
v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
206. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978).
207. See, e.g., Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963);
Sindell v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-14, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144-45, cert. denied, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 98, at 692-94.
208. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982)
(the defense of caveat emptor in the sale of homes by a vendor-builder is rejected); Wim-
mer v. Down East Properties, 406 A.2d 88, 93 (Me. 1979) (in the sale of new homes by
a builder-vendor, the law implies warranties that the house is suitable for habitation and
constructed in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner).
209. Significantly, the caveat emptor defense is not a recognized defense in CER-
CLA causes of action when the purchaser has no actual knowledge, even when the prop-
erty is purchased pursuant to an "as is" contract. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West
Supp. 1991) (stating that statutorily liable parties will be held liable "[njotwithstanding
any other provisions or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsec-
tion (b) of this section"). For examples of cases which have denied the caveat emptor
defense in CERCLA causes of action, see Westwood Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. National
Fuel & Gas Dist. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1280 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029
(1988); Southland v. Ashland Oil Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D.N.J. 1988); Chan-
nelmaster Satellite Sys. Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (E.D.N.C.
1988).
210. T & E Indus., 123 N.J. 371, 387, 587 A.2d 1249, 1257 (1991).
211. Id. at 389, 587 A.2d at 1258 (citing MacDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275,
398 A.2d 1283 (1979) (caveat emptor rejected in context of purchaser of new home from
small scale developer)).
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to prevent the problems from arising in the first place and that the
party responsible for creating the condition should be held liable.
The court found that the justifications for the builder-vendor excep-
tion were even more persuasive in the case where a vendor creates
the defective condition through its hazardous activities." 2 The court
concluded that rejecting the doctrine of caveat emptor where a ven-
dor's hazardous activities caused the purchaser harm was consonant
with the underlying policies of hazardous activity strict liability: en-
terprises who conduct hazardous activities should bear the costs at-
tributable to their activities.21 3
The T. & E. Industry court also rejected the contention that the
"as is" purchase contract214 relieved the seller of liability for the
harm attributable to its hazardous activities. The court held that in
order for an "as is" clause in a sales contract to relieve the seller
from liability, the buyer must have actual knowledge of the risk.2 15
The court concluded that a real estate contract which does not dis-
close the hazardous condition does not shield the seller who created
the hazardous condition from liability. 16
In Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America,217 the
defendant relied on the purchaser's inspection of the property to ar-
gue the purchaser assumed the risk a toxic contaminant might be
present at the site.21 The court acknowledged assumption of risk as
a defense in a strict liability action, but only where the plaintiff has
actual knowledge of the condition and knowingly and voluntarily en-
counters the risk.219 The court held the "as is" clause would not in-
sulate the seller from strict liability for its abnormally dangerous
activities because Amland had no actual knowledge of the hazardous
condition.220 Other courts have reached similar conclusions.221
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "as is" as a term which is ordinarily
understood to mean that the buyer assumed the entire risk as to the quality of the goods
involved. U.C.C. § 2-316 n.7 (1988). In real estate transactions, sellers and builders
often try to relieve themselves of any continuing liability by using disclaimers regarding
the state of the property and its structures.
215. T & E Indus., 123 N.J. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1258-59.
216. Id. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1259.
217. 711 F. Supp. 784 (1989).
218. Id. at 802.
219. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 cmt. c (regarding strict
liability, "the plaintiff does not assume the risk unless he knows of its existence")).
220. Id. at 803 n.20.
221. See, e.g., Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D.N.J. 1990) (an "as
is" clause does not relieve the seller of common law strict liability); Prospect Indus.
However, some courts reach a contrary conclusion, holding the
doctrine of caveat emptor prevails even when the purchaser does not
have actual knowledge of the contamination. In Futura Realty v.
Lone Star Bldg. Centers (E.), Inc., the court held the duty to disclose
applies exclusively to the sale of homes and not to the sale of com-
mercial property. 222 The court concluded that a seller of commercial
property contaminated by toxic chemicals had no duty to disclose
this fact to the buyer and therefore was not liable for any dam-
ages.213 The court noted caveat emptor was still the rule in the sale
of commercial property.224
In light of the massive toxic waste disposal problem in the United
States and the unique hazards which toxic waste poses to the envi-
ronment and human health, this view seems particularly archaic.
Other public policy considerations, such as holding the polluting
party liable and cleaning up the environment for the safety of hu-
manity, seem to outweigh the policy of caveat emptor, which was
enunciated long before the emergence of industrial toxic waste. The
party responsible for the contamination should remain liable for the
contamination as long as it exists or until a purchaser explicitly ac-
cepts liability. The polluting party is generally more knowledgeable
about the presence of toxic waste and is in a better position to pre-
vent the resulting problems than a purchaser who may not discover
the waste for several years. Moreover, the purchaser should not have
to shoulder the losses caused by the activities of a polluting predeces-
sor, which created toxic waste, for the predecessor's benefit. In fair-
ness, the benefiting party should pay for the harm which it caused.
Public health, nature conservation, and the goal of maintaining land
productivity speak in favor of abandoning the doctrine of caveat
emptor in the context of toxic waste in real estate transactions.226
Some states have statutorily eliminated the doctrine of caveat
emptor in the context of hazardous waste in real estate transac-
tions.226 In those states, sellers of real property have a statutory duty
to disclose the presence of hazardous waste upon transfer. However,
even the states that impose such a duty to disclose have only done so
Corp. v. Singer Co., 238 N.J. Super. 394, 569 A.2d 908 (1989) (the court rejected the
argument that the "as is" clause relieved the seller of liability when the purchaser had no
knowledge of the contamination).
222. 578 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. App. 1991).
223. Id. at 364-65.
224. Id.
225. See Schleich, supra note 162, at 1009.
226. States which have disclosure laws that are triggered upon sale include Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia. NANNEY, supra note 2, at 90;
Schleich, supra note 162, at 1004 n.42.
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in very recent years.227 In California, as of 1988, a seller of commer-
cial property has a statutory duty to disclose the presence of hazard-
ous waste located on the premises when the seller knows or has
reason to know of its presence.228 However, landowners who pur-
chased property prior to 1988 are not protected. In light of the poli-
cies discussed above, the defense of caveat emptor should not bar the
landowners' recovery.
CONCLUSION
The United States has a long history of improperly disposed toxic
waste. Many landowners have had the unpleasant and costly experi-
ence of discovering toxic waste on their premises left behind by a
predecessor in title. In order to achieve full compensation, landown-
ers increasingly look to the chain of title, seeking to hold the pol-
luters strictly liable for their hazardous activities. Although
hazardous activity strict liability can produce nightmarish results for
many former owners of industrial property, the theory does give in-
nocent owners of contaminated property an opportunity to. recover
costs which they many not otherwise be able to recover under federal
or state environmental legislation. Recognizing a cause of action by
a landowner against a predecessor in title whose hazardous activities
have caused the harm reflects the underlying premise of hazardous
activity strict liability: enterprises who engage in certain activities
should bear the costs attributable to such activities.229 In light of
growing concerns over the state of the environment and the perni-
cious effects of toxic waste on human health, the doctrine of caveat
emptor in the context of toxic waste should not defeat a landowners
cause of action against a polluting predecessor. The doctrine of haz-
ardous activity strict liability should be a recognized cause of action
by a landowner against a polluting predecessor.
QUINN SCALLON
227. For example, the effective date of Illinois' and Indiana's disclosure laws is
January 1, 1990.
228. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (West Supp. 1991). For a detailed
discussion of this section, see Oppenheimer & Nanney, Recent Developments Regarding
Hazardous Substance Disclosure Obligations of Lessees, Lessors and Sellers of Real
Property, in FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE (Jan./Feb. 1989).
229. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 63, § 78, at 555-56.

